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THE JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF AMERICAN 
EXCEPTIONALISM 
RACHEL LÓPEZ † 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
After World War II, the rise of international human rights law has gradually 
eroded what remained of national sovereignty, as a defense against the 
intervention of other states.  In the modern era, there is a growing sentiment that 
when the gravest human rights violations such as genocide, crimes against 
humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes occur, the international community 
has a “responsibility to protect” the victims of those crimes if the victims’ own 
government is unwilling or unable to do so.1  While much of the scholarship on 
the responsibility to protect focuses on the international community’s ability to 
engage in military intervention to carry out its obligations, the doctrine actually 
provides a menu of options that intervening States can employ to prevent serious 
abuses of human rights, including diplomatic measures, economic sanctions, 
and, notably for the purposes of this article, legal accountability in judicial fora.2  
Thus, in the modern era, States have greater latitude than ever before to 
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 1.  The responsibility to protect doctrine was first outlined in 2001 in a report commissioned by 
the Canadian government.  INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001) [hereinafter ICISS Report].  In 2005, more than 150 heads of state 
and government unanimously endorsed it at the U.N. World Summit.  2005 World Summit Outcome, 
G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005) [hereinafter World Summit Outcome]. Since 
that time, it has gained increasing prominence as a guiding principle.  Indeed, in September 2011, 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated, “Our debates are now about how, not whether, to implement 
the responsibility to protect.”  Garth Evans, End of the Argument:  How We Won the Debate Over 
Stopping Genocide, FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ 
articles/2011/11/28/gareth_evans_end_of_the_argument; See also Jordan Paust, International Law, 
Dignity, Democracy, and the Arab Spring, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 7-8 (2013). 
 2.  ICISS Report, at ¶1.38.  See also Ved Nanda, The Future under International Law of the 
Responsibility to Protect after Libya and Syria, 21 MICH. ST. INT’L. L. REV 1, 5 (2013) (“The ICISS's 
‘responsibility to protect’ concept comprises three distinct responsibilities: the responsibility to 
prevent, the responsibility to react (which in extreme cases may include military intervention), and 
the responsibility to rebuild after military intervention.  The responsibility to prevent focuses on the 
importance of early warning mechanisms and conflict prevention, and on the use of diplomatic, 
economic, and military means to contain a conflict before it escalates.”); World Summit Outcome, 
supra note 1, at ¶ 139. 
Lopez (Do Not Delete) 7/8/2014  2:55 PM 
2 DUKE FORUM FOR LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE Vol. 6:1 2014 
intervene in the sovereign affairs of other States when human rights violations 
have occurred.  Yet, the “when” and “how” of justifying intervention in any form 
on the basis of human rights remains murky and States across the globe are 
charting their own course through unsure waters.  In this article, I will argue that 
the United States has inconsistently fulfilled its responsibility to protect, evoking 
this doctrine as a basis for intervention only when it has a national interest at 
stake, and that this approach to human rights protection is improperly extending 
to the judiciary. 
This unbalanced invocation of the responsibility to protect aligns with many 
of the critiques levied against the United States for its shifting commitment to 
international human rights law more generally.  Indeed, since World War II, the 
United States has emerged as a controversial figure, leading the charge for the 
development of international law but then failing to sign or ratify major treaties 
that would provide accountability for human rights violations within its own 
borders.3  The American approach to international law is even more striking 
when compared to its European allies who have increasingly waived their 
sovereign rights in favor of greater European integration and stronger 
formations of international law.4  Critics have thus accused the United States of 
American Exceptionalism – “the idea that the United States is different from the 
rest of the world and unbound by the rules it promotes” – and have claimed that 
the U.S. has co-opted human rights for its own purposes.5  While these critiques 
primarily focus on the U.S.’s desire to exempt itself from human rights 
enforcement at home, the selective enforcement of human rights law presently 
extends beyond its borders, in part as response to the emergence of the 
responsibility to protect.  As will be explored further below, recent rhetoric by 
U.S. government officials reveal that the United States is conditioning its 
enforcement of human rights law abroad on the existence of a U.S. national 
interest, thereby sending the message that state actors who act contrary to U.S. 
interests are exceptionally more deserving of punishment for human rights 
violations ― thus, effectively draping a veil of immunity over its allies.  In 
particular, U.S. politicians have repeatedly invoked this approach when 
engaging in humanitarian military interventions overseas, most recently when 
making the case for military strikes in Syria.6  In essence, the question of whose 
 
 3.  Risa Kaufman, Human Rights in the United States: Reclaiming the History and Ensuring the 
Future, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 149, 153-54 (2008); MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, AMERICAN 
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2005).  Douglas J. Sylvester, Comment, Customary International 
Law, Forcible Abductions, and America’s Return to the “Savage State,” 42 BUFF. L. REV. 555, 612 (1994) 
(“The United States has played a tremendous role in developing the current system of international 
law, creating a body of law that is largely a reflection of American interests and philosophies.” Jed 
Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 NYU L. REV. 1971, 1982 (2004) (“More than any 
other single country, the United States is responsible for the existing international legal system, which 
naturally makes it rather hard for other states to understand how we can act as if that legal system 
does not apply to us.”) 
 4.  Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 1981. 
 5.  Id.; Austeen Parrish, Kiobel, Unilateralism, and the Retreat from Extraterritoriality, 28 MD. J. 
INT'L L. 101, 113 (2013). See generally JAMES PECK, IDEAL ILLUSIONS:  HOW THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CO-
OPTED HUMAN RIGHTS (2010); Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479 
(2003). 
 6.   President Barrack Obama explained that the motivation for intervening in Syria “has to do 
with not only international norms but also America’s core self-interest.”  Interview by Judy Woodruff 
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human rights deserve this country’s protection is becoming an expressly political 
one, driven by national interest. 
But the United States Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co. is striking evidence that this emerging American norm, 
which I will refer to as “nationalistic human rights protection,” is creeping into a 
realm where politics should have no bearing: the judiciary.7  In Kiobel, the 
majority of the Court held that the presumption against extraterritoriality8 was 
applicable to the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),9 a statute that courts had previously 
interpreted to provide jurisdiction for civil suits seeking damages for human 
rights violations occurring abroad.10  In arriving at this decision, Chief Justice 
John Roberts, who delivered the majority opinion of the Court, emphasized the 
fear that the adjudication of claims under the ATS in federal courts would have 
negative consequences on foreign relations and “imping[e] on the discretion of 
the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs.”11  At the 
same time, the Court left open the possibility that claims could overcome the 
presumption against extraterritoriality if they “touch and concern the territory of 
the United States. . . with sufficient force.”12  Thus, the Court foresaw instances 
where ATS claims could have so strong a nexus to the United States that there 
would be no doubt about its interest in the matter. 
While the majority opinion suggested a need for a strong U.S. connection as 
a condition for jurisdiction under the ATS, a concurring opinion, written by 
Justice Breyer and joined by Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Kagan, 
“interpret[ed] the statute as providing jurisdiction only where distinct American 
interests are at issue.”13  These Justices favored the adoption of a clear standard 
that would grant extraterritorial jurisdiction under the ATS, inter alia, when “the 
defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American 
national interest.”14  Given the inherent fuzziness of the “touch and concern” test, 
domestic courts may well look to this four-justice concurrence when determining 
whether human rights claims under the ATS are justiciable.  At least one court 
already has.15 
 
& Gwen Ifill with Barrack Obama, President of the United States, PBS News Hour (Aug. 28, 2013), 
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/white_house/july-dec13/obama_08-28.html.  After 
imposing a no-fly zone in Libya, President Obama explained to the American public that the United 
States had a “strategic interest” in protecting the Libyan people from mass violence and that there 
was a “price for America” if it failed to intervene. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President 
in Address to Nation on Libya (Mar. 28, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-
video/video/2011/03/28/president-obama-s-speech-libya#transcript. 
 7.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).   
 8.  The presumption against extraterritoriality is a canon of statutory interpretation that 
provides “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”  
The canon’s purpose is “to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other 
nations which could result in international discord.” EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 
244, 248 (1991). 
 9.  28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 10.  See generally, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659.   
 11.  Id. at 1664. (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004)). 
 12.  Id. at 1669.   
 13.  Id. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 14.  Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  
 15.  Mwani v. Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2013).  See also Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic 
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This opinion raises more questions than it resolves.  Although the Supreme 
Court adopted this threshold for the adjudication of ATS claims in US courts in 
an attempt to limit “unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign 
policy,”16 to what extent does this standard inherently require the judiciary to 
intervene as a political actor on the international stage?  Furthermore, if U.S. 
courts, guided by the language in the four justice concurrence, dismiss cases 
because they are considered to be contrary to U.S. national interest, would this 
legitimize critiques that the United States is co-opting human rights to support 
actions undertaken with political motives instead of humanitarian ones?  In this 
article, I will trace the emergence of the United States’ nationalistic protection of 
human rights and examine the ramifications of the judicial adoption of this 
approach to the adjudication of human rights claims.  I argue that not only 
would conditioning judicial human rights protection on national interest be 
antithetical to the underlying principles of human rights, but it would also run 
afoul of the political question doctrine.  I further suggest that Congress should 
correct this unclear and potentially problematic test by adopting a standard for 
jurisdiction that would allow the United States to more consistently fulfill its 
obligations under the responsibility to protect.  Specifically, Congress should 
adopt legislation that would allow U.S. courts to adjudicate human rights claims 
under the ATS when other States who might be in a better position to do so are 
unwilling or unable. 
Part II describes the historical context that gave rise to the gradual 
replacement of the non-interventionist default with the protection of individual 
human rights abroad.  In particular, it will focus on the development of the 
responsibility to protect, highlighting how it provides a broad array of actions, 
including judicial action, to protect individuals from grave human rights abuses.  
Part III traces the role of the United States in the development of human rights 
law and examines the critiques that the United States has used human rights as a 
tool to pursue its own national interests, especially in its justification of military 
interventions abroad.  Part IV describes how Kiobel, if interpreted in line with the 
four justice concurrence, represents a formal expansion of American 
Exceptionalism into the judiciary and outlines why that violates the central tenets 
of human rights law and the political question doctrine.  Part V suggests that 
Congress should remedy the problem created by Kiobel by adopting legislation 
consistent with the responsibility to protect doctrine.  Specifically, Congress 
should universally provide jurisdiction in U.S. courts for claims under the ATS 
when other States that are in a better position to adjudicate human rights claims 
are unwilling or unable to do so. 
 
 
of Iran, 947 F. Supp. 2d 48, 70 (D.D.C. 2013), reconsideration denied (July 12, 2013) (“Even though the 
respondents in Kiobel had American corporate affiliates and allegedly orchestrated and incited 
heinous actions against the Nigerian petitioners (including extrajudicial killing, torture, and crimes 
against humanity), the Supreme Court concluded that there was not a sufficient nexus to the territory 
or interests of the United States to confer ATS jurisdiction.”) (emphasis added) 
 16.  Id. at 1665. 
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II. THE BIRTH OF MODERN HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
The effective international protection of individuals that reaches into the 
borders of other countries is a relatively new phenomenon.  In order to fully 
understand the significance of the dilemma addressed in this article, this section 
provides a brief history of its development.  Specifically, it will trace how the 
erosion of sovereign rights paved the way for the emergence of the responsibility 
to protect. 
A. The Erosion of Sovereign Rights in the Face of Mass Atrocity 
The dilemma regarding when it is permissible for States to intervene in the 
affairs of others to protect human rights is a modern one and States across the 
world including the United States are still navigating its contours.  In the early 
20th century, a government’s internal treatment of its own citizens was relatively 
insulated from the law of nations, with the exception of some notable 
humanitarian interventions in the 19th century.17  Predominantly, however, 
sovereign rights provided a veil of immunity that protected even the most brutal 
governments from international scrutiny.18  International law offered limited 
protection of individual rights, such as those of citizens of one country injured by 
another country (e.g. international law governed injury to the property rights of 
aliens, attacks on aliens on foreign soil, and the use of force against civilians and 
soldiers during wartime).19 
Yet, over the course of history, sovereign rights have been gradually and 
cyclically eroding, with each grave breach of human rights that disturbs our 
modern sensibilities further enforcing our global interconnection and 
consequently instilling a growing belief in the duty to intervene in the affairs of 
other nations to protect individual human rights.  After the atrocities of World 
War I, the international community increasingly recognized that a government’s 
treatment of its own citizens could have implications globally and made efforts 
to influence the activity of governments vis-à-vis their citizens.20  One step taken 
in hopes of forestalling future devastation was the creation of the League of 
Nations, whose aim was to curb the behavior of individual sovereign States to 
act in the interest of the collective security of a community of States.21  Although 
the League of Nations lacked binding authority over sovereign States and its 
founding treaty did not explicitly mention human rights, it was the first major 
chink in the armor of sovereign rights that eventually allowed for the 
development of international human rights law.22 
 
 17.  STEVEN RATNER, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 4 (2009); See also Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values, and 
Functions, 216 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACAD. OF INT’L L. 12, 208 (1989). Concerning the 
19th and 20th century inroads on sovereignty, see Jordan Paust, Nonstate Actor Participation in 
International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion, 51 Va. J. Int'l L. 977 (2011). 
 18.  Lorna McGregor, Torture and State Immunity: Deflecting Impunity, Distorting Sovereignty, 18 
EUR. J. INT'L L. 903, 913 (2007). 
 19.  Id. at 4. See also, Paust, supra note 17.  
 20.  RATNER, supra note 17, at 6 (2009); CYNTHIA SOOHOO, BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME: A 
HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (2008). 
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and 
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The collective horrors and destruction of World War II ignited a desire for a 
deeper codification of international norms promoting the protection of human 
rights.  Faced again with the distinct reality that those States who abused the 
rights of their citizens were likely to present security risks for their neighbors, 
States recognized that a firmer commitment to international human rights was 
essential to encouraging stability and peace.23  In 1945, the Allied powers created 
the “United Nations,” which initially included only those countries united 
against the Axis powers.24  With the support of the United States, the United 
Nations adopted a Charter that served as the founding document for the 
organization and laid out a mandate to protect human rights.  In the preamble of 
the U.N. Charter, member States pledged “to reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights” and “the dignity and worth of the human person.”25 Moreover, 
Article 55 of the U.N. Charter identified human rights as essential to the 
promotion of international peace and stability: 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which 
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations . . . the United 
Nations shall promote . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language 
or religion.26 
The U.N. Charter committed its members “to take joint and separate action 
in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set 
forth in Article 55.”27 
Despite this bold language in the U.N. Charter its impact was limited by the 
inability of the U.N. General Assembly to adopt a list of protected human rights 
within the Charter28 and the affirmation of the principle of non-intervention in 
Article 2.7,29 which confirmed the protection of sovereign rights.  Additionally, 
the conclusion by U.S. courts that the U.N. Charter was not self-executing further 
constrained its practical application in the U.S.30 
 
 
 
the Mandate System of the League of Nations, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 513, 533 (2002).  
 23.  SOOHOO, supra note 20, at 23. 
 24.  Kathleen Renée Cronin-Furman, 60 Years of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 
Towards an Individual Responsibility to Protect, 25 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 175, 179-80 (2009). 
 25.  U.N. Charter preamble. 
 26.  U.N. Charter art. 55.  The United Nations Charter was incorporated into U.S. law via 59 Stat. 
1033 (1945). 
 27.  U.N. Charter art. 56.  
 28.  The list of protected human rights was articulated three years later in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which is considered soft law and non-binding on member States.  
 29.  Article 2.7 of the UN Charter prohibits intervention “in matters which are essentially within 
the jurisdiction of any State.” 
 30.  See, e.g., Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950), aff'd, 38 Cal.2d 718, 242 P.2d 
617 (1952); Camacho v. Rogers, 99 F. Supp. 155, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Frolova v. Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1985). But see Oyama v. California, 332 US 633, 672-73 
(1948) (Murphy, J., concurring, joined by Rutledge, J.); see also id. at 649-50 (Black, J., concurring, 
joined by Douglas, J.). 
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B.  The Emergence of the Responsibility to Protect 
This slow march away from sovereign rights and toward human rights 
during the past century paved the way for the emergence of the responsibility to 
protect, which describes the increasing acceptance that States have a duty to 
protect their own citizens from human rights abuses and when they fail to do so, 
other States must intervene.  This section traces the emergence of the 
responsibility to protect and describes the tools that States might use to fulfill this 
duty, highlighting in particular the possibility of judicial action under the legal 
theory of universal jurisdiction. 
In the 1990s, the failure of the international community to intervene to stop 
the genocide in Rwanda and the controversial humanitarian interventions in 
Kosovo, Bosnia, and Somalia raised questions about when foreign intervention is 
appropriate and catalyzed the formal articulation of the responsibility to protect 
doctrine.31  In 2000, the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan in his 
Millennium Report to the General Assembly urged member States to “unite in 
the pursuit of more effective policies, to stop organized mass murder and 
egregious violations of human rights.”32  In response to this call, the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), an independent body 
established by the Canadian Government, published a report in 2001 that first 
outlined the responsibility to protect,33 which it defined as “an idea that 
sovereign States have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from 
avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation – but that 
when they are unwilling or unable to do so, the responsibility must be borne by 
the broader community of states.”34  While the report mainly focused on military 
intervention, which it identified as the most controversial form of intervention, it 
also indicated that the responsibility to protect included “all forms of preventive 
measures, and coercive measures – sanctions and criminal prosecutions – falling 
short of military intervention.”35  The ICISS specifically listed universal 
jurisdiction as one of the tools in the “direct prevention toolbox,” stating: 
[t]he Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols (as well as the Convention 
against Torture) establish universal jurisdiction over crimes listed in them.  This 
means that any state party can bring to trial any person accused of such crimes.  
Universal jurisdiction is in any case held to exist under customary international 
law for genocide and crimes against humanity, and a number of countries have 
enacted legislation to give their courts jurisdiction in such cases.36 
Thus, from its inception, the responsibility to protect included judicial 
action as a tool that could be used to deter future atrocities. 
The responsibility to protect next gained ground, when the High-Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change established by Secretary General Kofi 
 
 31.  ICISS Report, supra note 1. 
 32.  U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, 47, 
U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (April 3, 2000), available at www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/ch3.pdf. 
 33.  Nanda, supra note 2, at 5. See also Saira Mohamed, Taking Stock of the Responsibility to Protect, 
48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 63 (2012).  
 34.  ICISS Report, supra note 1, at VIII.  
 35.  Id. at 8.  
 36.  Id. at 23-24. 
Lopez (Do Not Delete) 7/8/2014  2:55 PM 
8 DUKE FORUM FOR LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE Vol. 6:1 2014 
Annan endorsed the principle, identifying it as an “emerging norm” in its report 
in 2004.37  Still, the High-Level Panel noted that the responsibility to protect 
represented a “normative challenge to the United Nations” in that “the concept 
of State and international responsibility to protect civilians from the effects of 
war and human rights abuses has yet to truly overcome the tension between the 
competing claims of sovereign inviolability and the right to intervene.”38 
In 2005, however, the U.N. General Assembly explicitly endorsed the 
responsibility to protect when it adopted the World Summit Outcome.39  The 
World Summit Outcome document affirmed that the international community 
“has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means . . . to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.”40  However, the World Summit 
Outcome document watered down the responsibility to protect mandate with 
respect to military intervention, indicating that the international community 
should be “prepared to take collective action. . .should peaceful means be 
inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleaning, and crimes against humanity” as 
opposed to having an affirmative duty to do so.41 
III. THE U.S. DOUBLE STANDARD OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
As the responsibility to protect norm developed, States have been 
navigating the difficult question of when it is appropriate to intervene militarily, 
politically, and judicially in the domestic affairs of other States.  The United 
States has demonstrated marked inconsistencies in its approach to human rights 
enforcement, at times pushing the boundaries of when it is acceptable to 
intervene in the affairs of others in the name of human rights and at others 
defending sovereign boundaries when their own interests are threatened.42  As 
this section will further illuminate, the United States’ human rights policy has 
been a combination of leadership and resistance.43  On one hand, the United 
States has been instrumental in the development of international human rights 
law; on the other, it has resisted the implementation and enforcement of 
international human rights law within its own borders.44  For instance, the 
 
 37.  U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change: A 
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 ¶¶ 55, 203 (Dec. 2, 2004) 
[hereinafter High-Level Panel Report].  See also Nanda, supra note 2, at 7. 
 38.  High-Level Panel Report, supra note 37, at ¶ 36. 
 39.  World Summit Outcome, supra note 1. 
 40.  Id. at ¶ 139.  
 41.  Id. at ¶ 139.  (emphasis added) 
 42.  Jack Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law & the United States Double Standard, 1 GREEN 
BAG 365, 366 (1998) (“A recent example is President Clinton's support for an International Criminal 
Court on the condition that its jurisdiction be severely limited. A primary reason for this was the fear 
that U.S. troops and other U.S. government officials might be subject to the Tribunal's jurisdiction.  
For similar reasons the President has resisted signing the Land Mine Treaty.”). 
 43.  IGNATIEFF, supra note 3 (“Under some administrations, it has promoted human rights as if 
they were synonymous with American values, while under others, it has emphasized the superiority 
of American values over international standards.  This combination of leadership and resistance is 
what defines American human rights behavior as exceptional…”). 
 44.  See generally, Koh, supra note 5; Johan D. van der Vyver, American Exceptionalism: Human 
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United States has been a central figure during the drafting and negotiation of 
numerous human rights treaties, but it ultimately failed to put many of those 
same treaties into force within its domestic law (e.g. the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
the Rome Statute, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)).45  When the United States has 
ratified international human rights treaties, it has done so with so many 
reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs) that the treaties lost a fair 
measure of force within domestic law (e.g. Genocide Convention, Torture 
Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).46 
Many scholars have thus lambasted the United States for its exceptionalist stance 
on human rights, claiming that the United States believes that human rights is 
good for other countries, but is wary of subjecting its own human rights records 
to external scrutiny.47 
A. The United States’ Role in the Development of Human Rights Law 
American exceptionalism has been present since the birth of the modern 
day human rights regime.  When the community of Allied Nations contemplated 
the development of the League of Nations, President Woodrow Wilson 
proclaimed that the United States “puts human rights above all other rights” and 
would fight to “make the world safe for democracy.”48  However, the United 
States ultimately refused to join the League of Nations and retreated into 
isolation.49  Henry Cabot Lodge, one of the leading isolationist voices, explained, 
“We do not want a narrow alley of escape from the jurisdiction of the League.  
We want to prevent any jurisdiction whatsoever.”50  The United States also 
opposed the proposal to create a tribunal that would hold foreign officials 
responsible for violations of “the law and customs of war and the laws of 
humanity,” a would-be precursor of the International Criminal Court.51  
Secretary of State Robert Lansing bluntly stated his rationale for the rejection of 
 
Rights, International Criminal Justice, and National Self-Righteousness, 50 EMORY L.J. 775, 776 (2001) (“For 
a foreign observer, the policies and practices of the United States in the arena of international 
relations are quite confusing.  Its foreign policy fluctuates between the seemingly contradictory forces 
of engagement and isolationism.”). 
 45.  Goldsmith, supra note 42, at 366-68. 
 46.  Id. at 367. Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator 
Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 344 (1995) (“By adhering to human rights conventions subject to these 
reservations, the United States, it is charged, is pretending to assume international obligations but in 
fact is undertaking nothing.”) But see Jordan Paust, Human Rights Through the ATS After Kiobel: Partial 
Extraterritoriality, Misconceptions, and Elusive and Problematic Judicially-Created Criteria, 6 DUKE FORUM 
FOR LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE __ at note 151 (2014) (regarding the reach of Article 50 of the ICCPR).  
 47.  Henkin, supra note 46, at 366 (“The problem is that the United States does not embrace the 
international human rights standards that it urges on others. The United States systematically 
declines to apply international human rights law to its domestic officials.  All three branches of the 
federal government perpetuate this double standard”); Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 1973 (“Since 1945, 
however, America has spoken out of both sides of its mouth on international law, championing 
internationalism in one breath, rejecting it in the next.”). 
 48.  SOOHOO, supra note 20, at 19. 
 49.  Id. at 21. 
 50.  Id. at 22. 
 51.  Id. at 20. 
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the proposal: “The essence of sovereignty is the absence of responsibility.”52 
After World War II, the United States was a driving force in promoting the 
reemergence of human rights as a guidepost for future relations amongst 
nations.53 Legal scholar Jed Rubenfeld characterized the United States’ embrace 
of international law after World War II as “part of an ambition to Americanize as 
much of the world as it could, which meant both the export of American 
institutions, including constitutional law, and the strengthening of American 
global influence.”54 Indeed, President Franklin Roosevelt intrinsically linked 
American ideals of freedom and democracy to human rights in his Four 
Freedoms speech, proclaiming that “freedom means the supremacy of human 
rights everywhere.”55  Eleanor Roosevelt also played a central role in the 
development of modern human rights doctrine.  As the chair of the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights, she helped to draft the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and is credited with negotiating its 
unanimous adoption.56  Still, even in the early days of human rights law, the 
United States led efforts to restrain its force as evinced by Eleanor Roosevelt’s 
speech before the General Assembly emphasizing the non-binding nature of the 
UDHR just prior to its adoption: 
In giving our approval to the declaration today, it is of primary importance that 
we keep clearly in mind the basic character of the document.  It is not a treaty; it 
is not an international agreement.  It is not and does not purport to be a 
statement of law or of legal obligation.57 
After all, the Truman administration had conditioned its support of the 
UDHR on its non-binding nature out of fear that African-Americans would 
evoke human rights to challenge the Jim Crow laws in the South.58 
After the adoption of the UDHR, U.S. support for human rights law waned.  
In the early years of the Cold War, leaders in the executive branch saw little use 
for human rights and instead waged a covert anti-communist propaganda war 
against the Soviet Union.59  The Eisenhower administration worried that 
supporting the enforcement of human rights law might lead to other countries, 
particularly the Soviet Union, “prying around in human rights conditions in the 
United States.”60  Despite these concerns, his administration still supported the 
drafting of both International Covenants on human rights.  Under the Nixon 
 
 52.  Id. Secretary Lansing issued a formal dissent to the proposed development of an 
international criminal tribunal and indicated that he did not intend to allow human rights law to 
impinge on the sovereign rights of the United States. 
 53.  SOOHOO, supra note 20. 
 54.  Rubenfeld, supra note 3. 
 55.  Franklin Roosevelt, President of the United States, Address of January 6, 1941, in THE PUBLIC 
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 672 (vol. 9) (Samuel Rosenman ed.).  
 56.  John Carey, The U.N. Human Rights Council: What Would Eleanor Roosevelt Say?, 15 ILSA J. 
INT'L & COMP. L. 459, 459-60 (2009). 
 57.  H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 61 (1950).  
 58.  PECK, supra note 5, at 17. 
 59.  Id. at 18-26. 
 60.  Dulles, United States Policy Regarding Draft International Covenants on Human Rights: The 1953 
Change, (Feb. 19 1953) in 3 Foreign Relations of the United States 1555, (1952-1954) available at 
http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs/1952-54v03/reference/frus.frus195254v03.i0014.pdf.  
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administration, the human rights agenda lost further ground as “realpolitik,” the 
sense that the United States should pursue its national interest devoid of any 
moral or ideological concerns, dominated U.S. foreign policy.61  In his 
confirmation hearing for Secretary of State before the Senate in 1973, Henry 
Kissinger explained the Nixon administration’s hesitation to pursue human 
rights objectives abroad, stating that “the protection of human rights is a very 
sensitive aspect of domestic jurisdiction of . . . governments . . . If the 
infringement of human rights is not so offensive that we cannot live with it, we 
will seek to work out what we can with the country in order to increase our 
influence.”62  In practice, this approach meant that during this period the United 
States rarely condemned human rights violations and frequently provided U.S. 
aid to countries with terrible human rights records.63  Congress became 
increasingly frustrated by the executive branch’s support of human rights 
abusers and ultimately adopted measures that would restrict or deny foreign aid 
on the basis of a country’s human rights record, which President Nixon 
subsequently ignored.64 
During the later years of the Cold War, the executive branch re-embraced 
human rights as a counter-narrative to communism and accusations of American 
imperialism as well as a way to improve the United States’ image after the 
scandal of the Vietnam War.65  As Anthony Lake, the State Department’s director 
of policy planning in the Carter administration, put it, “this human rights 
business” became the “centerpiece of [the U.S.] effort to restore American’s post-
Vietnam, post-Watergate image.”66  Indeed, President Carter announced that 
“[h]uman rights [was] the soul of American foreign policy” on the thirtieth 
anniversary of the signing of the UDHR.67 
Similar to the Nixon administration, the Reagan administration first viewed 
human rights as an impediment to pursuing the United States’ national interest, 
but then later narrowly redefined human rights as supporting the American 
values of liberty, democracy, and capitalism in order to accomplish his political 
agenda of fighting communism.68  George H.W. Bush took a pragmatist 
approach to human rights protection.  He supported human rights, but only 
when the political costs were low.69 
Bill Clinton embraced human rights in a fashion similar to Carter. Before 
Bill Clinton took office, he announced that “U.S. foreign policy cannot be 
divorced from the moral principles most Americans share.  We cannot disregard 
how other governments treat their own people.”70  Under his administration, the 
 
 61.  CLAIR APODACA, UNDERSTANDING U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY:  A PARADOXICAL LEGACY 30-
31 (2006). 
 62.  Id. at 30.  
 63.  Id. at 31-33.  
 64.  Id. 33-44; see also Foreign Assistance Act § 32, Pub. L. No. 87-195. 
 65.  PECK, supra note 5, at 45-46, 85-129. 
 66.  IGNATIEFF, supra note 3. 
 67.  Jimmy Carter, Universal Declaration of Human Rights Remarks at a White House Meeting 
Commemorating the 30th Anniversary of the Declaration’s Signing (Dec. 6, 1978).  
 68.  Apodaca, supra note 61, at 82. 
 69.  Id.  
 70.  Id. at 137. 
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United States, as part of the Security Council, voted in favor of creating the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).71  The U.S. government 
under the Clinton administration was instrumental in the negotiation of the 
Rome Statute, which created the International Criminal Court (ICC).72  However, 
President Clinton declined to sign the Landmines Convention73 and failed to 
intervene during the genocides in Rwanda,74 one of the most gruesome instances 
of human rights violations of our time.75 
B. The U.S. Nationalistic Responsibility to Protect 
The move away from sovereign rights and toward the responsibility to 
protect in the early 2000s ushered in a new era of military intervention justified 
by the protection of human rights, during which the United States’ pursuit of 
national interest goals through human rights protection became more overt and 
unilateral.  Whereas before U.S. officials only considered the use of human rights 
as a tool to accomplish national interest behind closed doors, during the last two 
decades, the nationalistic protection of human rights has become explicit as 
dramatically illustrated by the rhetoric surrounding U.S. military interventions 
abroad. 
Markedly, President George W. Bush, who was inaugurated into office the 
same year as the ICISS report on the responsibility to protect was published, 
evoked human rights as part of its justification for intervening in Iraq, an oil rich 
country of significant geopolitical interest to the United States.76  In making the 
case for war in Iraq, President Bush characterized Saddam Hussein as a 
“dangerous man” who violated human rights and “used weapons of mass 
destruction against Iraq’s neighbors and against Iraq’s people.”77  Paradoxically, 
 
 71.  Jelena Pejic, The United States and the International Criminal Court: One Loophole Too Many, 78 
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 267, 270 (2001) 
 72.  See generally, id.;  See also Lucy Martinez, Prosecuting Terrorists at the International Criminal 
Court: Possibilities and Problems, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 57 (2002) (“The United States was extensively 
involved in the drafting of the Rome Statute, and also in the preparation for and negotiations at the 
Rome Conference.”). 
 73.  Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 1980. 
 74.  See generally, PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE 
KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES (1998); SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE 
AGE OF GENOCIDE (2002). 
 75.  “While Rwanda may be the best-known humanitarian tragedy of the second half of the 
twentieth century, Darfur may garner that dubious distinction for the first half of the twenty-first.”  
Ralph Mamiya, Taking Judicial Notice of Genocide? The Problematic Law and Policy of the Karemera 
Decision, 25 WIS. INT'L L.J. 1, 18 (2007). 
 76.  President George W. Bush, Speech to the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia: The 
Struggle for Democracy in Iraq (Dec. 12, 2005). See also Brian Knowlton, Whatever the Weapons Result, 
He Says, Saddam was a Threat: Bush Defends Iraq Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2004, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/28/news/28iht-prexy_ed3__1.html. 
 77.  Bush, supra note 76. George Bush's Iraq war speech from the Cross Hall in the White House, 
Mar. 17, 2003, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/18/usa.iraq.  
See also Knowlton, supra note 76.  Interestingly, this claim was based in part on reports that Saddam 
Hussein had used white phosphorus against the Kurds in 1991, the very same chemical agent that the 
United States used in the Battle of Fallujah in 2004. U.S. DEP. OF DEFENSE, POSSIBLE USE OF 
PHOSPHOROUS CHEMICAL WEAPONS BY IRAQ IN KURDISH AREAS ALONG THE IRAQI-TURKISH-IRANIAN 
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even though the United States formally recognized the killing that occurred in 
Darfur in the early 2000s as genocide, it failed to intervene to protect the 
residents of Darfur.78 
Similar to the justification for war in Iraq, U.S. officials cited a confluence of 
human rights and national interest concerns in support for military intervention 
in Libya.  As legal scholar Saira Mohamed articulated in her article Taking Stock of 
the Responsibility to Protect, though intervention in Libya was championed as a 
triumph for the responsibility to protect, it actually represents the endorsement 
of “a responsibility triggered only when state interests align with that duty.”79  
As articulated plainly by President Obama in his first speech after the no fly zone 
was instituted, the United States is “naturally reluctant to use force to solve the 
world’s many challenges.  But when our interests and values are at stake, we 
have a responsibility to act.”80  He identified those interests as preventing the 
destabilization of the region, avoiding the flow of refugees from Libya to 
neighboring countries, deterring other repressive leaders from committing mass 
atrocities, and affirming the credibility of the U.N. Security Council.81 
Leading up to the decision to launch military strikes against the Assad 
regime in Syria, President Obama also tied his decision to intervene to 
underlying national interests, stating that “if the Assad regime used chemical 
weapons on his own people, tha[n] that would change some of our calculations. 
And the reason has to do with not only international norms but also America’s 
core self-interest.”82  Secretary of State John Kerry similarly evoked this 
nationalistic approach to human rights protection.  On August 30, 2013, when he 
laid out that evidence that Assad used chemical weapons, he stated, “our 
concern with the cause of the defenseless people of Syria is about choices that 
will directly affect our role in the world and our interests in the world.”83 
 
BORDERS, available at http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/declassdocs/dia/19950901/ 
950901_22431050_91r.html;  see also Peter Popham, U.S. intelligence classified white phosphorus as 
chemical weapon, INDEPENDENT, Nov. 23 2005, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/ 
world/americas/us-intelligence-classified-white-phosphorus-as-chemical-weapon-516523.html. US 
Used White Phosphorous in Iraq, BBC NEWS, Nov. 16, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
middle_east/4440664.stm; see also Captain James T. Cobb, First Lieutenant Christopher A. LaCour & 
Sergeant First Class William H. Hight, The Fight for Fallujah, FIELD ARTILLERY MAG. 26, available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2005/2-2AARlow.pdf. 
 78.  Although the United Nations report did not conclude that atrocities in Darfur were 
genocide, U.S. officials said that genocide had occurred there.  See Glenn Kessler, U.S. Calls Killings in 
Sudan Genocide, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A8364-2004Sep9.html. 
 79.  Mohamed, supra note 33, at 333. (“The clear emphasis of the justification was on the United 
States— the capacity of the United States to intervene and the national interest of the United States in 
doing so.”) 
 80.  President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to Nation on Libya (Mar. 28, 
2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2011/03/28/president-
obama-s-speech-libya#transcript.  
 81.  Id.  
 82.   President Barrack Obama Interview with Judy Woodruff and Gwen Ifill, PBS News Hour, 
August 28, 2013, available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/white_house/july-dec13/ 
obama_08-28.html.   
 83.  Secretary of State John Kerry, Remarks on Syria (August 30, 2013), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/running-transcript-secretary-of-state-
john-kerrys-remarks-on-syria-on-aug-30/2013/08/30/f3a63a1a-1193-11e3-85b6-
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IV. THE NATIONALISTIC PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE JUDICIARY 
Recently, the judiciary has intimated that it will follow the Executive 
Branch’s lead and condition its protection of human rights on the presence of a 
national interest.  In 2013, the Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co. issued an opinion restricting the ability of U.S. courts to adjudicate human 
rights claims arising from conduct that occurred abroad to instances where that 
conduct “touches and concerns” the United States.84  The four justice concurring 
opinion in Kiobel further outlined specific criteria that would allow U.S. courts to 
adjudicate human rights claims that arose abroad, explicitly including the 
existence of a U.S. national interest as one ground for doing so. 
A. Summary of the Holding in Kiobel 
In Kiobel, the Petitioners, a group of Nigerians who now reside in the United 
States, brought suit against Dutch, British, and Nigerian oil companies.85  They 
alleged that the companies had aided and abetted the Nigerian military in 
committing, inter alia, extrajudicial killings, torture, and arbitrary arrests in 
retaliation for their community’s protest against oil exploration.86  The suit was 
brought under the ATS, a statute that was enacted by the First Congress as part 
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and grants federal jurisdiction over “any civil action 
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty 
of the United States.”87 
The ATS was rarely used until 1979 when the Center for Constitutional 
Rights evoked it on behalf of the Filártiga family in a lawsuit against former 
Paraguayan official Americo Peña-Irala, who was responsible for the torture and 
murder of seventeen-year-old Joelito Filártiga.88  The Second Circuit held that 
torture was a “clear and unambiguous” violation of the law of nations and that 
“international law confers fundamental rights upon all people vis-à-vis their own 
governments.”89  Since the Second Circuit’s landmark decision in Filártiga, courts 
across the country adjudicated claims from the victims of human rights 
violations world-wide.90 
 
d27422650fd5_story_3.html 
 84.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 85.  Id. at 1659. 
 86.  Id. at 1662-63.   
 87.  28 U.S.C. § 1350. Ch. 20, §§ 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (1789);  See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 
876, 878 (2nd Cir. 1980); Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1663 (“Passed as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATS 
was invoked twice in the late 18th century, but then only once more over the next 167 years.”) 
 88.  Complaint, Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876, available at http://ccrjustice.org/ 
files/April%201979%20Filartiga%20v.%20Pena-Irala%20Complaint.pdf.  See Paust, supra note 48, at 
Part III A (regarding four cases that addressed ATS claims in the 1790s). 
 89.  Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884-85. 
 90.  See, e.g., Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 578 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(Guatemala); Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2004) (China); Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371 (4th 
Cir. 2009) (Somalia); Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388 (4th Cir. 2011) (Iraq); El-Shifa Pharmaceutical 
Industries Co. v. U.S., 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sudan);  Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877 (7th 
Cir. 2005) (Nigeria); Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007) (Israel); Abecassis v. Wyatt, 
704 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (Israel); Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Md. 2010) 
(Iraq); Ali Shafi v. Palestinian Authority, 642 F.3d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (West Bank); Belhas v. 
Ya’Alon, 515 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Lebanon); Chavez v. Carranza, 413 F. Supp. 2d 891 (W.D. 
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Kiobel unhinged much of the precedent created in the wake of Filártiga.  In 
line with other recent cases such as Morrison v. National Australia Bank and 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown in which the Court has reined in 
the exterritorial application of U.S. laws, the Court in Kiobel declined to extend 
the ATS’s reach outside of its own borders under the facts of the case.91  It 
unanimously held that the petitioners had no cause of action under the ATS for 
violations of the law of nations where the alleged actions occurred within a 
sovereign other than the United States, lacked impact on U.S. interests, and 
involved a foreign defendant.92  A majority of the Court applied the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, which is a canon of statutory interpretation that 
provides that when a statute does not include a clear indication that it was meant 
to apply overseas, it does not.93  The five justice majority opinion authored by 
Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that the ruling reflected the “presumption that 
United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world.”94 
While this language indicates a hesitance to act as the world police, the 
Court’s stated rationale for applying the presumption against extraterritoriality 
to this particular statute and its articulation of when the presumption may be 
overcome signals a willingness to do so when it is in this country’s national 
interest and has low political costs.  Specifically, the majority opinion, reiterating 
its opinion in Sosa, cautioned that “the potential foreign policy implications of 
recognizing causes under the ATS should make courts particularly wary of 
impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in 
managing foreign affairs.”95  Moreover, the five justices in the majority explained 
that the goal of applying the presumption against extraterritoriality in this case 
was to “ensure that the Judiciary does not erroneously adopt an interpretation of 
U.S. law that carries foreign policy consequences not clearly intended by the 
political branches.”96  In essence, although Kiobel involved a foreign corporation, 
 
Tenn. 2005) (El Salvador);  Chowdhury v. WorldTel Bangladesh Holding, Ltd., 588 F. Supp. 2d 375 
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (Bangladesh); Estate of Abtan v. Blackwater Lodge and Training Center, 611 F. Supp. 
2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009) (Iraq); Estate of Manook v. Research Triangle Institute, Intern., 759 F. Supp. 2d 674 
(E.D.N.C. 2010) (Iraq); Genocide Victims of Krajina v. L-3 Services, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 2d 814 (N.D. Ill. 
2011) (Croatia); In re Chiquita Brands Intern., Inc., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (Colombia); 
Lizarbe v. Rondon, 642 F. Supp. 2d 473 (D. Md. 2009) (Peru); M.C. v. Bianchi, 782 F. Supp. 2d 127 
(E.D. Pa. 2011) (Moldova).; Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2007) (Dominican Republic); Doe 
v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (Ivory Coast); El-Masri v. Tenet, 479 F.3d 296 (4th 
Cir. 2007) (Macedonia and Afghanistan); Holocaust Victims of Bank Theft v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 
807 F. Supp. 2d 689 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (Hungary); Jean v. Dorelien, 431 F.3d 776 (11 Cir. 2005) (Haiti); 
Tachiona v. U.S., 386 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004) (Zimbabwe); Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent Organ 
v. Dow Chemical Co., 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008) (Vietnam). 
 91.  Parrish, supra note 5, at 117-18 (“Kiobel is by no means unique. In a number of other contexts, 
U.S. courts have begun to display a nervousness about being a battleground for foreign disputes.”). 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 127, 130 (2010). 
 92.  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. (“We therefore conclude that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and that nothing in the statute rebuts that 
presumption.”) 
 93.  Id. at 1664. (citing Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 127, 130 (2010)). 
 94.  Id. (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007)). 
 95.  Id. at 1665 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727). 
 96.  Id. at 1664.    
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not a foreign government or official, the judiciary characterized the adjudication 
of human rights claims under the ATS as a threat to US diplomacy and foreign 
relations. 
Still, the majority of the Court left some wiggle room when it concluded that 
ATS claims could overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality if they 
“touch and concern the territory of the United States. . . with sufficient force.”97  
The meaning and application of “touch and concern” is not entirely certain.  As 
Justice Kennedy writes in his concurrence, “the Court [was] careful to leave open 
a number of significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation of the 
[ATS].”98  Justice Alito characterized the majority’s test as “leav[ing] much 
unanswered.”99 Justice Breyer’s four-justice concurrence similarly lamented that 
the majority’s standard “leaves for another day the determination of just when 
the presumption against extraterritoriality may be overcome.”100  Still, given that 
the Court applied the presumption against extraterritoriality in an effort to avoid 
unforeseen foreign policy consequences that the protection of human rights 
might occasion, claims where a national interest is present are likely to be among 
those that “touch and concern the territory of the United States. . . with sufficient 
force” to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
While a careful analysis of the majority opinion suggests that the presence 
of an unequivocal U.S. interest could be grounds for providing jurisdiction under 
the ATS to hear claims regarding human rights violations abroad, the four-justice 
concurrence by Justice Breyer states it outright.  These four Justices expressly 
“interpret[ed] the statute as providing jurisdiction only where distinct American 
interests are at issue.”101  Justice Breyer specifically identified three factors that 
would support an application of the ATS extraterritorially: 
(1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American 
national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an important 
American national interest, and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the 
United States from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal 
liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind.102 
In light of the ambiguity of the majority’s “touch and concern” standard, 
U.S. courts interpreting Kiobel are likely to look to the four justice concurring 
opinion for further direction.  At least one court, the D.C. District Court, has 
done so already.  In Mwani v. Laden, the D.C. District Court, guided by the 
language in the four justice concurrence, concluded that the claim overcame the 
presumption against extraterritoriality because “[i]t [wa]s obvious that a case 
involving an attack on the United States Embassy in Nairobi is tied much more 
closely to our national interests than a case whose only tie to our nation is a 
corporate presence here.”103 
 
 97.  Id. at 1669.   
 98.  Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 99.  Id. at 1669 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 100.  Id. at 1673(Breyer J., concurring). 
 101.  Id. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 102.  Id. at 1671 (Breyer J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 103.  Mwani v. Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2013). 
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B. Executive Intervention in ATS cases 
The briefs submitted on behalf of the Executive branch in ATS cases over 
the last 34 years document a conversation between the executive and judicial 
branches of the United States government.  While each individual 
administration’s briefs reflect their broader human rights policy, a survey of 
these briefs also reveal a gradual, though inconsistent, shift toward 
understanding the ATS as impinging on foreign affairs.  While courts in the 
United States initially rejected the requirement of a U.S. nexus for the protection 
of human rights advocated by Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, 
and George W. Bush, the Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 
finally legitimized this approach to ATS litigation in 2013. 
When the ATS first came to be used as a tool for the protection of human 
rights in Filartiga, the Carter administration filed submissions in support of 
plaintiffs seeking civil remedies for violations of fundamental human rights 
abroad.104  In response to a request from the Second Circuit, the Department of 
State (DOS) under the Carter administration submitted a memorandum as 
amicus curiae arguing that the district court’s dismissal of the case should be 
reversed because torture constituted a fundamental and universally accepted 
human right.105  The DOS reasoned that if there is consensus in the international 
community that an individual right is guaranteed and a widely shared 
understanding of the scope of that right, then “there is little danger that judicial 
enforcement will impair our foreign policy efforts”106 and “to the contrary, a 
refusal to recognize a private cause of action in these circumstances might 
seriously damage the credibility of our nation’s commitment to the protection of 
human rights.”107  The DOS was careful to note that “it is likely that only a few 
rights have the degree of specificity and universality to permit private 
enforcement and that the protection of other asserted rights must be left to the 
political branches of government,”108 a stance echoed by the Supreme Court in 
Sosa nearly 25 years later.109  The DOS also emphasized that these were rights to 
which “all individuals are entitled, regardless of nationality.”110  The stance 
expressed in the memorandum as amicus curiae reflects the Carter 
administration’s embrace of human rights in the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate 
era. 
In direct contrast to approach of the Carter administration, the Reagan 
administration filed an amicus brief in Trajano v. Marcos urging the Ninth Circuit 
to affirm the dismissal by the federal district court of an ATS case against 
 
 104.  Beth Stephens, Judicial Deference and the Unreasonable Views of the Bush Administration, 33 
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 773 (2008). 
 105.  Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15-17, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090).  
 106.  Id. at 22.   
 107.  Id. at 22-23.   
 108.  Id. at 6. 
 109.  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729 (2004) (“[O]ther considerations persuade us that the judicial power 
should be exercised on the understanding that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, 
and thus open to a narrow class of international norms today.”).   
 110.  Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 
876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090).  
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Ferdinand Marcos, the former dictator of the Philippines who was residing in the 
United States.111  The brief argued that U.S. courts should only have jurisdiction 
when the concerned violations of the law of nations contravene rights and 
obligations that form part of the law of the United States and have some nexus to 
the United States, its citizens or its territory.112  At the same time, it stated that 
relations between the Philippines and the United States would not be harmed if 
the suit went forward.113 The Ninth Circuit in part relying on this statement from 
the executive branch reversed the district court’s dismissal, but did not adopt (or 
even address) the standard for jurisdiction proposed by the Reagan 
administration.114  This amicus brief can also be seen as an expression of the 
Reagan administration’s policy toward human rights in that Reagan supported 
Marcos because he was an important ally of the United States in fighting 
communism during the Cold War.115  In fact, when a coup was staged against 
Marcos, President Reagan offered him exile in the United States.116 
In line with his pragmatist approach to human rights protection, the 
administration of George H.W. Bush Sr. did not file any submissions in ATS 
cases during its tenure.117  During hearings on the Torture Victim Protection Act 
(TVPA), a statute which created a cause of action for torture and extrajudicial 
executions, officials from the administration of George H.W. Bush opposed the 
Filártiga line of cases and argued that a TVPA that provides exterritorial 
jurisdiction when there is no nexus to the United States would risk provoking 
retaliatory lawsuits against U.S. officials and create tensions with other countries 
that could hamper the executive branch’s relations with foreign nations.118  Still, 
when President George H.W. Bush signed the TVPA, he expressly supported an 
extraterritorial dimension to human rights litigation in domestic courts, stating 
that “[i]n this new era, in which countries throughout the world are turning to 
democratic institutions and the rule of law, we must maintain and strengthen 
our commitment to ensuring that human rights are respected everywhere.”119 
When President Bill Clinton took office, the executive branch once again 
supported human rights litigation in U.S. courts.  In Kadic v. Karadzic, the DOS 
and DOJ filed a joint Statement of Interest stating that the case did not raise any 
political questions and encouraging the Second Circuit to reverse the district 
court’s dismissal of a case against the President of Republika Srpska, the leader 
 
 111.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Trajano v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(table disposition) (Nos. 86-2448, 86-15039). 
 112.  Id. at 4-6, 9-13.  
 113.  Id. at 32. 
 114.  Marcos, 878 F.2d 1439 at 2. 
 115.  Janet L. Sawin, A Study of Peaceful Revolution: The Philippines, 1986, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 
181, 185 (Winter 1993). 
 116.  Erin M. Callan, In Re Mr. and Mrs. Doe: Witnesses Before the Grand Jury and the Head of State 
Immunity Doctrine, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 117, 119 (1989) 
 117.  Stephens, supra note 104, at 791. 
 118.  Torture Victim Protection Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 1629 and H.R. 1662 Before the Subcomm. on 
Immigration and Refugee Affairs of the S. Judiciary Comm., 101st Cong. 11-16 (1990) (statement of John O. 
McGinnis, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice) & 22-29 (1990) (statement of David P. 
Stewart, Assistant Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State). 
 119.  Statement on Signing the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 465, 466 (Mar. 12, 1992). 
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of a self-proclaimed Bosnian–Serb republic within Bosnia–Herzegovina, for 
brutal acts of rape, forced prostitution, forced impregnation, torture, and 
summary execution.120  In Doe v. Unocal, in response to a request from the 
district court, the Clinton administration stated that “at this time adjudication of 
the claims based on allegations of torture and slavery would not prejudice or 
impede the conduct of U.S. foreign relations with the current government of 
Burma.”121 
At the same time that President George W. Bush was pursuing military 
intervention abroad in the name of human rights, he was also ushering in a new 
era of hostile intervention by the executive branch in ATS cases, particularly in 
cases involving corporate defendants.122  In these cases the Bush administration 
consistently argued that the ATS threatened important foreign policy interests.123  
In total, the Bush administration made submissions in ten ATS cases involving 
corporate defendants; however, in a dramatic departure from prior cases, the 
U.S. courts only deferred to the administration’s foreign policy concerns in two 
cases, one of which involved a U.S. contractor.124 
One illustration of this phenomenon was Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.  In that 
case, a Mexican national Humberto Alvarez-Machain, who was abducted from 
his house in Mexico by Jose Francisco Sosa and other Mexican nationals with the 
authorization of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) so that he 
could stand trial in the United States for the torture and murder of a DEA agent, 
sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and the ATS after his acquittal.  
When Sosa was pending before the Supreme Court, the Bush administration 
urged the Court “to correct the fundamentally mistaken understanding of” the 
Filártiga line of cases.125  Bush era attorneys argued that the ATS was a strictly 
jurisdictional statute and did not create a private right of action in U.S. courts, 
 
 120.  Statement of Interest of the United States at 1-2, Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(Nos. 94-9035, 94-9069). 
 121.  Statement of Interest of the United States, Nat'l Coal. Gov't of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, 
Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (No. 96-6112), reprinted as Exhibit A, Nat'l Coal. Gov't, 176 F.R.D. 
at 361-62. 
 122.  Stephens, supra note104, at 792. 
 123.  Id.; see, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, Doe v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 
708 (9th Cir. 2005) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628). 
 124.  Id. at 773-74. (“Although the courts have emphasized that executive branch views are not 
binding, they rarely rejected them prior to the presidency of George W. Bush. This historically 
deferential approach took a dramatic turn during the Bush administration, when the executive 
branch informed the courts that a series of human rights cases against corporate defendants 
threatened U.S. foreign policy interests.”).  In Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., the next of kin of Rachel Corrie, 
an American human rights defender who was killed by a bulldozer that the Israeli government used 
to demolish housing in Palestine, sued the American corporation that sold bulldozers to Israel. The 
Department of State and Department of Justice under the Bush administration intervened as amicus 
curiae supporting the district court’s dismissal of the case.  In contradiction to its stance in Filartiga, 
the United States argued that “[n]othing in the ATS or in its contemporary history suggests that 
Congress intended it to apply to conduct in foreign lands.”  Since the United States government had 
provided Israel with the funding it used to buy the bulldozers, it agreed with the district court, which 
concluded that a judgment against Caterpillar would impinge its discretion to sell military 
equipment to Israel and “other allied countries.” Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Corrie 
v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-36210). 
 125.  Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 8, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339). 
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that existing ATS litigation raised separation of powers concerns since it could 
potentially interfere with the foreign policy matters exclusively entrusted to the 
political branches, and finally that the presumption against extraterritoriality 
precluded the adjudication of claims of human rights abuses that occurred 
abroad.126 
The Court agreed with the executive branch that the ATS was only 
jurisdictional and did not provide a private right of action, but concluded that 
“at the time of enactment the jurisdiction enabled federal courts to hear claims in 
a very limited category defined by the law of nations and recognized at common 
law” and that Alvarez’s claims were outside of this narrow set of claims.127  The 
Court did not, however, entertain the arguments raised by executive branch 
regarding separation of powers concerns or the presumption against 
extraterritoriality in Sosa.128  In direct opposition to the Bush administration’s 
insistence that it correct the mistake of Filártiga, the Supreme Court expressly 
endorsed the “birth of the modern line of cases” after Filártiga.129 
In Kiobel, the majority of the Court made an about-face when it issued an 
opinion that applied the presumption against extraterritoriality and thereby 
affirmed the approach to adjudication of human rights claims under the ATS 
advocated by the Bush administration in Sosa.130 The Obama administration, 
acting as amicus curiae, discouraged the Supreme Court from creating a 
categorical rule for the exercise of jurisdiction under the ATS for human rights 
violations occurring in a foreign country, but stated that “allowing suits based on 
conduct occurring in a foreign country in the circumstances presented in Filártiga 
is consistent with the foreign relations interests of the United States, including 
the promotion of respect for human rights.”131 
V. WHY NATIONALISTIC PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IS PROBLEMATIC 
The Supreme Court’s adoption of a nexus requirement, particularly one 
guided by the presence of a U.S. national interest, is problematic on multiple 
levels.  First, the requirement is contrary to the very nature of human rights, 
which are universal and obligatory as the Supreme Court recognized in Sosa.  
This conception of human rights protection makes the United States fall short of 
its obligations under international human rights law.  Second, by adopting a 
standard of selective jurisdiction based on national interest as opposed to 
universal jurisdiction, the United States legitimizes critics that it has co-opted 
human rights to accomplish broader foreign policy goals.  Finally, if Kiobel is read 
as requiring an inspection by the judiciary into what human rights claims are in 
the United States’ national interest, it is inconsistent with the political question 
 
 126.  Id. at 6-9. 
 127.  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712. 
 128.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (“We therefore conclude 
that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and that nothing in 
the statute rebuts that presumption.”). 
 129.  See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724-25, 731-32 (“The position we take today has been assumed by 
federal courts for 24 years, ever since the Second Circuit decided citing Filartiga….”).   
 130.  Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1659. 
 131.  Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4-5, Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1659 
(No. 10-1491). 
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doctrine, which precludes the judiciary from making determinations about how 
claims may or may not align with U.S. national interest. 
The Nationalistic Protection Undermines the Universality of Human Rights 
The United States has adopted several human rights instruments, including 
the UDHR, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and 
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), that all highlight the universal nature of human 
rights.132  Specifically, the UDHR, the CAT, and the ICCPR all describe how 
human rights derive from the “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the 
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.”133  In sum, 
these documents describe human rights as innate to our very nature as human 
beings. 
Previously, the United States considered the ATS to be one of the avenues 
that it used to satisfy its obligations under international human rights law.  For 
instance, in its most recent report to the Human Rights Committee, a treaty body 
that monitors state parties’ compliance with the ICCPR, the United States touted 
its adjudication of human rights cases via the ATS as one of the ways in which it 
fulfilled its human rights commitments, in particular its duty to protect 
individuals’ right to be free from torture and other forms of cruel and unusual 
treatment or punishment.134 
However, the jurisdictional test for ATS claims adopted by the Supreme 
Court in Kiobel may inhibit the United States from fully meeting its obligations to 
protect human rights as defined by international law.  The nexus test in Kiobel, 
especially if interpreted as creating a national interest threshold for human rights 
protection, undermines the basic tenets of human rights doctrine by implicitly 
favoring the protection of certain people’s rights over others.  Moreover, 
conditioning human rights on national interest makes them dependent on what 
region of the world a person lives, a person’s politics, or whether the interests of 
 
 132.  When this article refers to the universality of human rights, it is referring to the principle 
that all human beings by their very nature are born with certain rights.  Please note, however, that 
there is a separate ongoing debate about whether human rights standards can be qualified by cultural 
differences.  Dianne Otto, Rethinking the "Universality" of Human Rights Law, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 1, 3 (1997) 
 133.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, preamble. The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, preamble. 
 134.  FOURTH PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS 
COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS ¶ 185 (Dec. 30, 2011) (“In certain circumstances victims may also pursue civil 
remedies against foreign officials in U.S. courts.  For instance, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), codified at 
28 U.S.C 1350, provides that U.S. federal district courts ‘shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.’ Since the decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), the statute has been 
relied on by alien plaintiffs and interpreted by federal courts in various cases raising claims under 
customary international law, including torture. In 2004, the Supreme Court held that the ATS is ‘in 
terms only jurisdictional’ but that, in enacting the ATS in 1789, Congress intended to ‘enable [] federal 
courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law of nations and recognized at 
common law.’ In an amicus curiae brief filed in the Second Circuit in Filartiga, the United States 
described the ATS as one avenue through which ‘an individual’s fundamental human rights [can be] 
in certain situations directly enforceable in domestic courts.’ In that case, the United States recognized 
that acts of torture can be actionable under the ATS.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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their government align with those of the United States.  In a word, it politicizes 
human rights protection, which by its very essence should not be subject to 
politics, and thereby legitimizes critiques that the United States uses human 
rights as a political tool without a deeper commitment to its underlying 
principles. 
A judicially-imposed nationalistic threshold for the adjudication of human 
rights claims is also contrary to the Supreme Court’s own articulation of the 
purpose of the ATS.  In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court held that the ATS was 
meant to enforce international norms that are “specific, universal, and 
obligatory.”135  To allow courts to pick and choose amongst claims of human 
rights abuses that they feel sufficiently “touch and concern” the United States, in 
particular if that determination is based on national interest, undermines that 
fundamental principle articulated in Sosa.  Furthermore, nationalistic protection 
of human rights in the context of the ATS conflicts with the original intent of the 
very Act that created it.  The Supreme Court has identified the ATS as one of 
several provisions in the Judiciary Act that reflect “a concern for uniformity in 
this country’s dealings with foreign nations.”136  The nebulous standard adopted 
in Kiobel might occasion the disparate treatment of cases according to a country’s 
connection with the United States, thus conflicting with the original purpose of 
the Act itself. 
A. The Unraveling of American Universal Jurisdiction 
Both the majority opinion and the four justice concurrence in Kiobel rejected 
the understanding of various U.S. courts and legal scholars prior to Kiobel that 
the ATS provided universal jurisdiction for conduct in violation of universally 
recognized human rights.137  Typically, when a court exercises jurisdiction over a 
matter, the claim must have some connection to the territory, national interest, or 
a citizen of the State where the court sits, but universal jurisdiction is different.138  
 
 135.  “Actionable violations of international law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and 
obligatory.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (quoting In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 
1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 136.  Id. at 427 n. 25. 
 137.  Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 404 (1987). See also, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 
70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing the provision that defines universal jurisdiction in the Third 
Restatement on Foreign Relations Law of the United States as support for jurisdiction in that case);  
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring); and 
Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 n.25, 185 (D. Mass. 1995).  Julian Ku, Kiobel and the Surprising 
Death of Universal Jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort Statute, 107 AMER. J. INTL. L. 835, 837 (2014) (Despite 
its prominence in Sosa and subsequent academic support, both the Roberts majority and the Breyer 
concurring opinion rejected a universal jurisdiction reading of the ATS.”) Jordan J. Paust, Kiobel, 
Corporate Liability, and the Extraterritorial Reach of the ATS, 53 VA. J. INT'L L. DIG. 18, 20 (2012) (“As 
international law is the substantive law that is expressly incorporated, universal jurisdiction exists for 
ATS lawsuits and has provided the primary basis for the extraterritorial reach of the ATS in cases 
since the 1790s.”) But see, Curtis Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323, 
343 (“As an initial matter, it is not clear that the international law theory of universal jurisdiction even 
applies to civil liability. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law asserts that it does, but it 
cites no support for that proposition.”) 
 138.  Ku, supra note 137, at 835 (“When a state seeks to exercise jurisdiction outside of its territory, 
international law generally requires a state to show some connection to its territory, nationality, or 
national security interests.  These limitations flow from fundamental international legal principles of 
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With universal jurisdiction, “there is no link of territoriality or nationality 
between the State and the conduct of the offender, nor is the State seeking to 
protect its security or credit.” 139  The legal theory behind universal jurisdiction is 
that some crimes are so “threatening to the international community or so 
heinous in scope and degree that they offend the interest of all humanity.”140  
Thus, a national court exercising universal jurisdiction does not act in its own 
name uti singulus (a special interest), but as an agent of the international 
community.141 
The principle of universal jurisdiction was first applied to human rights 
violations during the trials of Nazi officials after World War II.  These tribunals 
cited piracy as the first instance of the “Universality of Jurisdiction” and claimed 
that this doctrine should be extended to war crimes as well.142  Other 
international and national courts, including U.S. federal courts, and legal 
scholars have also recognized piracy as the foundation of universal jurisdiction 
under international law.143  Piracy is “crucial to the origins of universal 
jurisdiction,”144 because it occurs on the high seas, outside of the jurisdiction of 
any one state, and so jurisdiction is awarded to any State who can apprehend a 
pirate.145  “Before International Law in the modern sense of the term was in 
existence, a pirate was already considered an outlaw, a ‘hostis humani generis’ 
[enemy of the human race.].”146  In the present era, universal jurisdiction has 
been expanded to include other violations of the law of nations that occur in 
countries where the State is unable and unwilling to prosecute them.147  Like 
 
sovereign equality and noninterference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states.”). 
 139.  L. REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, 
5 (2003).  See also Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.:  The Supreme Court and the Alien 
Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 601, 619 (2013).  
 140.  Michael Scharf, Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals of Non-State Party 
States, 35 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 2, 363, 369 (2001).   
 141.  Georges Abi-Saab, The Proper Role of Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 3, 596, 601 
(2003).   
 142.  1 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 35, 42 (1947) (Brit. Mil. Ct. Almelo). 
Cynthia Soohoo, Bringing Human Rights Home: A History of Human Rights in the United States 19 
(2008). 
 143.  Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, The Principle and Practice of Universal Jurisdiction 
(2010). See also United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 223 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (“[Universal] 
jurisdiction had its origins in the special problems and characteristics of piracy. It is only in recent 
times that nations have begun to extend this type of jurisdiction to other crimes.”); S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. 
Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 69 (Sept. 7) (Moore, J., dissenting) (“Piracy by law of nations, in 
its jurisdictional aspects, is sui generis.”); Eichmann v. Attorney-General, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. 1962).   
 144.  PRINCETON UNIV. PROGRAM IN LAW & PUB. AFFAIRS, THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON 
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 45 (2001), available at  
http:// www.princeton.edu/~lapa/unive_jur.pdf. 
 145.  See Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 450 U.N.T.S. 6465; see also 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 105, Dec. 10, 1982, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-39 
(1994), 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 (“On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, 
every State may seize a pirate ship ... and arrest the persons and seize the property on board ... [and] 
may decide upon the penalties to be imposed.”). See also United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 
153, 156 (1820) (noting that “pirates being hostes humani generis, are punishable in the tribunals of all 
nations. All nations are engaged in a league against them for the mutual defence and safety of all.”). 
 146.  L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 609 (8th ed., 1955).  
 147.  In the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law (1965), piracy was listed as the only 
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piracy, these international crimes would otherwise escape punishment because 
they occur in locations where the State has abdicated its responsibility to 
prosecute.  Thus, it is the responsibility of the international community to step in 
and provide a jurisdiction of last resort, as explained by the Spanish Tribunal 
Supremo in a universal jurisdiction case against Guatemalan generals accused of 
genocide.148 
The ATS shares the same historical origins and purpose as other universal 
jurisdiction provisions.  Indeed, U.S. courts have consistently evoked the 
connection between piracy and human rights violations when finding 
jurisdiction in ATS cases.149  For instance, in Filartiga, the Second Circuit 
explained that “for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become—like the 
pirate . . . before him—hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”150  The 
Supreme Court underscored in Sosa that “when Congress passed the ATS, three 
principal offenses against the law of nations had been identified by Blackstone: 
violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and 
piracy.”151 The majority of the court concluded that other causes of action based 
upon present-day law of nations may be cognizable under the ATS if the claim 
both “rest[s] on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world 
and [is] defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 
[aforementioned] 18th-century paradigms [.]”152  
Yet, the marriage of jurisdiction in ATS claims with the presence of a 
national interest by the four justice concurrence in Kiobel undermines the 
understanding of the ATS as a provision that provides universal jurisdiction and 
instead reflects the protective principle of jurisdiction under international law 
that provides jurisdiction over criminal offenses when they involve a threat to 
the sovereignty of the United States.153  As defined by section 402 of the Third 
Restatement on Foreign Relations Law of the United States, courts can evoke the 
 
universally cognizable offense. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations added several other 
universal crimes, such as war crimes and apartheid. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS Law § 404 (1987). 
 148.  Guatemalan Genocide Case, STC 237/2005 (Spain, Tribunal Constitucional, September 26, 
2005). 
 149.  See, e.g., Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 n.25, 185 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding, on the 
basis of the piracy analogy in Filartiga, that torture is a “universal” crime and thus federal courts have 
“universal jurisdiction” in an ATS action brought by aliens and an American nun against former 
Guatemalan Minister of Defense alleging brutalities in Guatemala);  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 762. (Breyer, J., 
concurring); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 204-8 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 150.  Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890.   
 151.  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724; See also Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1666. 
 152.  Id. at 725. 
 153.  See e.g., United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922) (“But the same rule of interpretation 
should not be applied to criminal statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependent on their 
locality for the government’s jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the government to 
defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed by its own 
citizens, officers, or agents. Some such offenses can only be committed within the territorial 
jurisdiction diction of the government because of the local acts required to constitute them. Others are 
such that to limit their locus to the strictly territorial jurisdiction would be greatly to curtail the scope 
and usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity for frauds as easily committed by 
citizens on the high seas and in foreign countries as at home. In such cases, Congress has not thought 
it necessary to make specific provision in the law that the locus shall include the high seas and 
foreign countries, but allows it to be inferred from the nature of the offense.”). 
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protective principle when jurisdiction is prescribed based upon “certain conduct 
of non-nationals outside a state’s territory that is directed against the security of 
the state or against a limited class of state interests that threaten the integrity of 
governmental functions (such as counterfeiting).”154 
Requiring that a human rights offense “touch and concern” the United 
States in order to receive relief in U.S. courts, particularly if that determination is 
driven by considerations of U.S. national interest, implies that when the United 
States exercises jurisdiction in ATS cases it is not acting for the benefit of all 
nations (in line with the principles of universal jurisdiction), but instead in its 
own narrow self-interest.  This exposes the United States to criticism that it only 
uses human rights as a pretext to intervene in the internal affairs of others to 
serve its own political goals.  Moreover, as explained above, the ICISS report 
identified universal jurisdiction as a tool in the responsibility to protect “toolbox” 
that could be used to deter future atrocities.  Thus, interpreting the ATS in a way 
that precludes universal jurisdiction limits our capacity to meet our obligations 
under the responsibility to protect doctrine. 
B. The Judicial Protection of Human Rights as a Political Question 
Some scholars like Jack Goldsmith offer a pragmatist viewpoint, arguing 
that it is better for there to be selective enforcement of human rights by the 
United States than none at all.155  While the wisdom of the political branches 
intervening to protect human rights only when the interests of the United States 
are at play is debatable, the political question doctrine precludes the judiciary 
from making such determinations.156  The political question doctrine, which is 
rooted in concerns over the separation of powers, provides that some questions 
are best suited for the political branches to decide unencumbered by the 
oversight of the judicial branch.157  As Justice Frankfurther famously 
underscored, “Court[s] ought not enter into the political thicket.”158  In Marbury 
v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote: “The province of the court is, 
solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or 
executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion.  Questions, in 
their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the 
executive, can never be made in this court.”159 The Supreme Court in Baker v. 
Carr listed the six factors that may trigger the doctrine: 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is 
 
 154.  Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 402 (1987). 
 155.  See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 42, at 373 (“A second possible response is that the United 
States should stop enforcing human rights norms against other countries. Such a course would 
alleviate any hypocrisy that inheres in the double standard. But it would harm the promotion of 
international human rights. A United States double standard is in this sense preferable to no 
enforcement at all.”). 
 156.  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). 
 157.  Renowned legal scholar Alexander Bickel put it this way, “it is quite plain that some 
questions are held to be political pursuant to a decision on principle that there ought to be discretion 
free of principled rules.” ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 186 (1962). 
 158.  Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).   
 159.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 170 (1803). 
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found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without 
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the 
impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without 
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an 
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; 
or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by 
various departments on one question.160 
Cases pertaining to foreign affairs often raise political questions.161  As the 
Supreme Court has recognized, “[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our 
government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative-
’the political’-departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be 
done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or 
decision.”162  While not every case involving a question of foreign affairs is 
inherently nonjusticiable, those cases “frequently turn on standards that defy 
judicial application, or involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably 
committed to the executive or legislature” and “uniquely demand single-voiced 
statement of the Government’s views.”163 
Requiring the judiciary to weigh questions of national interest is squarely 
within the realm of political questions that the doctrine was meant to preclude.  
In fact, Justice John Marshall explicitly addressed this question when he was a 
Congressman.  In a speech to the House of Representatives, he explained his 
view that the judiciary is ill-equipped to make decisions involving, even in part, 
judgments about how our national interests align, because federal courts lack the 
necessary information to evaluate foreign relations, the political accountability to 
the public, and the power to enforce such decisions.164  Additionally, allowing 
the judiciary to do so poses very real risks that the U.S. Government could end 
up speaking with two voices, which would trigger one of the six factors listed in 
Baker: “the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by 
various departments on one question.”165  Similarly, the “touch and concern” 
standard is so vague and indefinite that judiciary could easily construe it in ways 
that impede the discretionary powers of the other two branches.  Interestingly, it 
 
 160.  Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
 161.  United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 4 L. Ed. 471; Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 307, 309, 7 L. 
Ed. 415; Garcia v. Lee, 12 Pet. 511, 517, 520, 9 L. Ed. 1176; Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Pet. 415, 420, 
10 L. Ed. 226; In re Cooper, 143 U. S. 472, 499, 12 Sup. Ct. 453, 36 L. Ed. 232. 
 162.  Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918). 
 163.  Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. See generally, Gwynne Skinner, Misunderstood, Misconstrued, and Now 
Clearly Dead:  The “Political Question Doctrine” as a Justiciability Doctrine, 29 J.L. & POL. 425 
(forthcoming 2014) (describing how many lower federal courts have erroneously dismissed cases as 
non-justiciable due to the political question doctrine); see also Louis Henkin, Is There a Political 
Question Doctrine?, 85 YALE L. J. 597 (1976). 
 164.  John Marshall, Speech (March 7, 1800), in 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 103 (Charles T. 
Cullen ed., 1984). According to legal scholars Walter Dellinger and Jefferson Powell, Marbury v. 
Madison reflected his viewpoint in that the Court determined the dispute to be judiciable because it 
“primarily involved the rights of an individual rather than the duties and interests of the nation.” See 
also Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, Marshall's Questions, 2 GREEN BAG 367, 372-74 (1999). 
 165.  Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
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appears that the Supreme Court’s standard in Kiobel could undermine the very 
reason that it applied the presumption against extraterritoriality in the first place: 
to avoid “impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches 
in managing foreign affairs.”166 
VI. A CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTION TO KIOBEL’S PROBLEMATIC PRECEDENT 
To rectify the problems created by Kiobel, Congress should pass legislation 
that both creates universal enforcement of human rights law and is in line with 
the responsibility to protect.  As explained above, the responsibility to protect 
mandates that States only intervene when the government where the violation 
occurred is unwilling and unable to protect its citizen.  Congress could adopt 
legislation creating a similar standard for the adjudication of human rights 
claims under the ATS. 
Such a standard would be consistent with other courts that adjudicate 
human rights claims.  The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
for example, is guided by the principle of complementarity, which permits the 
ICC to exercise jurisdiction only when the countries that would be better 
positioned to investigate or prosecute do not (or at least not genuinely).167  As 
provided by the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the ICC, the Court can  
assume jurisdiction in two instances.168  First, the ICC will render a case 
admissible when there has been no investigation or prosecution by the State 
which would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned.169  
However, the ICC allows the State to challenge the admissibility of a case on the 
grounds that it is currently investigating or prosecuting the case.170  Second, the 
ICC will exercise jurisdiction when the State is investigating or prosecuting a 
case (or already has done so), but the ICC determines that the State is unwilling 
or unable to do so genuinely.171 
 
 166.  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727). 
 167.  Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 497 (2003) 
(explaining that “under the principle of complementarity, the court must defer to national courts 
unless they are unable or unwilling to prosecute.”). 
 168.  Darryl Robinson, The Mysterious Mysteriousness of Complementarity, 21 Crim. L. Forum 67 
(2010) (explaining that the text of Article 17 requires a two-step test and that the first step – the so-
called “proceedings requirement” – is an examination into whether a State is currently investigating 
or prosecuting the case or already has done so.) 
 169.  Id. at 71 (“Where there has been no investigation or trial in relation to the case, then none of 
the these conditions for inadmissibility can be met, so the case remains admissible before the 
Court.”).  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17, 18, & 19, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 
183/9 (Jul. 17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].  See also Situation In The Republic Of Kenya (Decision 
Pursuant To Article 15 Of The Rome Statute On The Authorization Of An Investigation Into The 
Situation In The Republic Of Kenya), Case No. ICC-01-09-19, par. 52-54 (March 31, 2010). 
 170.  Rome Statute at art. 19(2)(b). 
 171.  Id. at art. 1 & 17.  See also Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain 
Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the 
Case, ICC-01/04-01/07-1497, para. 78 (“[I]n considering whether a case is inadmissible under article 
17 (1) (a) and (b) of the Statute, the initial questions to ask are (1) whether there are ongoing 
investigations or prosecutions, or (2) whether there have been investigations in the past, and the State 
having jurisdiction has decided not to prosecute the person concerned. It is only when the answers to 
these questions are in the affirmative that one has to look to the second halves of sub-paragraphs (a) 
and (b) and to examine the question of unwillingness and inability.”) 
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Alternatively, Congress could create an exhaustion requirement that would 
oblige any plaintiff bringing a claim under the ATS to first seek domestic 
remedies where the conduct occurred, similar to such requirements employed by 
several international tribunals.172  For instance, the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (IACHR), which hears cases against the United States, requires 
proof of the exhaustion of domestic remedies as a condition for the admissibility 
of a case.  Under Article 31(1) of the IACHR Rules of Procedure, a petition is only 
admissible if domestic remedies have been pursued and exhausted.  Article 31(2) 
however offers several exemptions to the requirement of exhaustion of domestic 
remedies that amount to a “futility” exception (i.e. a petitioner may show that 
pursuing domestic remedies would be futile).  Specifically, a petitioner need not 
prove that he or she exhausted domestic remedies if: (1) domestic legislation 
does not afford due process of law for the protection of the rights allegedly 
violated, (2) there has been a denial of access to or prevention from exhausting 
the domestic remedies, or (3) there has been an unwarranted delay in rendering a 
final judgment under the domestic remedies. 
There is precedent for adopting such a requirement in the United States.  
Another human rights statute that was recently adopted by Congress already 
includes an exhaustion requirement.  The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 
which incorporated the CAT into U.S. domestic law, explicitly includes an 
exhaustion requirement, which could be the basis for similar legislation 
concerning the ATS.173  Moreover, the judiciary has indicated that it is amenable 
to such a requirement.  In Sosa, the Supreme Court noted that the European 
Commission acting as amicus curiae argued “that basic principles of 
international law require that before asserting a claim in a foreign forum, the 
claimant must have exhausted any remedies available in the domestic legal 
system” and that the Court would “certainly consider this requirement in an 
appropriate case.”174  The adoption of an exhaustion requirement would be 
another means to ensuring the universal protection of human rights under the 
ATS, which would be consistent with international law. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The erosion of the sovereign rights and the development of the 
responsibility to protect has resulted in a dilemma concerning when foreign 
nations can legitimately intervene to protect the civilian populations of other 
countries that is unique to this century.  Although critiques of the United States 
 
 172.  See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 
35(1) (Nov. 4, 1950), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm (“The 
Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to 
the generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date 
on which the final decision was taken.”); American Convention on Human Rights, art. 46(1)(a), 9 
I.L.M. 673, 687 (Apr. 8, 1970) (requiring that remedies under domestic law have been pursued and 
exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law). 
 173.  Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, § 2(b), 106 Stat. 73. (“A court shall decline to hear a 
claim under this section if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies in the 
place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.”). 
 174.  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733, note 21.  See also Brief for European Commission as Amicus Curiae 24, 
n. 54 (citing I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 472–481 (6th ed.2003)). 
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have long centered on its inconsistent adherence to and enforcement of human 
rights law, never before has the United States so explicitly and publicly 
acknowledged its nationalistic protection of human rights.  While the rhetoric of 
U.S. officials concerning military intervention is the most salient example of the 
national interest threshold for human rights enforcement, recently it has also 
seeped into the judiciary.  While it still remains to be seen how the “touch and 
concern” test in Kiobel will be interpreted, if the four justice concurrence is any 
indication, the issue may turn on the United States’ national interest in 
adjudicating the claim.  This approach to human rights protection is inconsistent 
with the basic principles of human rights, the responsibility to protect, and the 
Supreme Court’s articulation of the function of the ATS.  It also raises concerns 
with respect to the political question doctrine, which precludes the judiciary 
from deciding questions that are best left to the discretion of the political 
branches such as determinations regarding this country’s national interest.  To 
cure these problems with Kiobel, Congress should adopt legislation that provides 
for jurisdiction under the ATS when States where the abuses occurred are 
unwilling and unable to adjudicate claims arising from them. 
 
